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In September 2008, shortly after the war between Russia and Georgia, Freedom House—an organization funded largely by the U.S. government—wrote in a letter to “relevant commit-
tees” in Congress: 
Georgia’s democracy deficit was an important but underap-
preciated factor in the recent crisis over South Ossetia.  Be-
cause of the lack of independent television, inadequate insti-
tutional checks and balances, weak political opposition and 
a marginalized civil society, President Saakashvili was free 
to make his decisions during the crisis without the need to 
consider other views.  One wonders if the decision-making 
process would have been enhanced if stronger democratic in-
stitutional mechanisms had been in place. (Freedom House)
The Freedom House letter suggests that there is a strong correlation 
between democratic deficits in Georgia and President Saakashvili’s 
ability to go to war with Russia.  The letter’s implication is obvious: 
had more robust democratic institutions been in place, the war be-
tween Russia and Georgia might not have occurred.  In this paper, 
I argue that U.S. government assistance to Georgia since 2003 has 
failed to support robust democratization, focusing too much on 
strengthening the executive branch of the Georgian government. 
Once Saakashvili took office, Washington reduced funding to 
critical democratization programs, especially those that supported 
independent media and civil society organizations.  This shift in 
U.S. assistance, which contributed to the slowdown of democratic 
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consolidation in Georgia, demonstrates that U.S. aid is critical to 
Georgia’s political development. 
Due to its strategic location and nascent statehood, “democ-
racy in Georgia is a matter of international interest” (Nodia and 
Scholtbach 1).  There are many factors influencing democratiza-
tion in Georgia; “international interest,” or assistance, is just one of 
them.  Yet the role of the United States is preeminently important 
for democratic developments in Georgia.  Relations between Geor-
gia and the United States are buttressed by close personal ties be-
tween former President Bush—who in 2005 became the first U.S. 
president to visit Georgia—and Saakashvili, who named a Geor-
gian highway after Bush.  American assistance to Georgia is critical 
for the development of democracy; unfortunately, however, it has 
set the wrong incentives for the Georgian government.
An assessment of U.S. assistance to Georgia after the 2008 
war with Russia is sobering.  If one assumes that Washington 
pursued an idealist agenda vis-à-vis Georgia, then the war left no 
doubt about the failure of this agenda.  The war demonstrated, in 
fact, that President Saakashvili has almost unchecked authority 
and that the current state of democracy in Georgia is dire.  Some 
argue that Washington’s pronouncements about Georgian democ-
racy were insincere, and that what Washington really sought was 
a reliable strategic partner in a critical region. Even such a realist 
assessment, however, does not fully explain the events of August 
2008.  Today, Georgia faces domestic instability and international 
insecurity—Washington’s assistance, it seems, has furthered nei-
ther moral nor pragmatic goals.  As one important step to support 
either an idealist or a realist agenda, the new U.S. administration 
should stop funding initiatives that contribute to a hyper-presiden-
tial government and redirect assistance to independent media and 
civic organizations.1 
1 Many development organizations from European countries, such as the German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) and the British Department for International Development (DFID) 
have also concentrated their resources on state-building, and economic, and legal reforms 
rather than on civil society projects. This essay centers on the role of the U.S., but research 
on European development organizations and democracy in Georgia should be done. 
71Journal of Politics & Society
u.s. interests
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has ac-
tively pursued strategic interests in Georgia.  In the second half of 
the 1990s, the United States under Bill Clinton became increasing-
ly involved in energy projects in the South Caucasus through the 
creation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, and 
Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa pipelines, each of which involved billion dollar 
investments from American and British oil companies (Penev 35). 
These pipelines were of vital importance to Washington, which 
sought to develop the energy corridor from the Caspian region via 
Georgia in order to bypass Russian and Iranian territories. 
In its annual reports, the State Department mentions “U.S. 
Strategic Interests” in Georgia.  Of these interests, a number have 
been of vital importance since 2003.  According to the U.S. govern-
ment, Georgia is an outpost on the “frontier of freedom,” an ally in 
the global war on terrorism, a supporter of the Iraq war, and a part-
ner in an energy-rich region (“U.S. Government Assistance”).
The U.S. government has been referring to Georgia as a part 
of the frontier of freedom since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the first 
of the so-called “color revolutions” (Bush).  In November 2003, 
thousands of Georgians took to the streets to protest official elec-
tion results, and the largely non-violent protests led to the dismissal 
of President Eduard Shevardnadze and the subsequent inaugura-
tion of Mikheil Saakashvili, the pro-Western opposition leader. 
In the years since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has moved 
to the forefront of the U.S. agenda because of supposed “concerns 
about threats posed by terrorist groups in the area”—and because 
of its outspoken criticism of Russia.  Georgia has also become an 
important ally of the United States in the war in Iraq, contribut-
ing some 2,000 soldiers before Tbilisi was forced to withdraw its 
troops in light of its war with Russia (Baev; Collin).
In May 2005, President Bush visited Georgia and addressed 
thousands of enthusiastic Georgians on Liberty Square in Tbilisi: 
“You are building a democratic society where the rights of minori-
ties are respected, where a free press flourishes, a vigorous opposi-
72 Schellinger  •  Democracy in Georgia
tion is welcome, and unity is achieved through peace” (Bush).   With 
increasing frequency, the Bush Administration relied on Georgia as 
an example of a major success in its democracy-promoting strategy 
(Gvosdev).
the Dual Goals of u.s. PoliCy towarD GeorGia
According to Henry Kissinger, American foreign policy has 
been most successful when it balanced “morality and pragmatism,” 
and—conversely—serious errors have occurred whenever the 
United States “lost the sense of balance between our interests and 
our ideals” (Kissinger 190).  While idealist-oriented policymakers 
generally see democratization as an end goal, realist strategists tend 
to use it as a means to advance other interests.  It was the overlap 
of these two approaches that made U.S. democracy promotion in 
Georgia partially successful—until the transfer of power to Mr. 
Saakashvili.
Both idealists and realists had an interest in fostering political 
competition under the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze.  The 
democratization of Georgia, the end goal of the idealist faction, 
was the priority of realists as well, since it was assumed that a re-
gime change in Tbilisi would allow the United States to advance its 
interests in the South Caucasus.  However, in the aftermath of the 
war between Russia and Georgia, it has become clear that neither 
the idealists nor the realists have achieved their goals in Georgia.
Since 2003, America has limited its support for independent 
media outlets, civic organizations, and opposition parties.   Instead, 
the U.S. has given priority to state-building, with the intention of 
strengthening the institutional capacity of the Georgian govern-
ment. It is possible, of course, that Washington based its decision 
to shift its resources on its experiences with democracy promotion 
in the 1990s.  Thomas Carothers notes that the halt in the global 
democratization process in the 1990s was partly due to the United 
States’ insufficient focus on state-building.  In many cases, states 
were too weak to achieve democratic consolidation, and their tran-
sitional stages became permanent “grey zones” of illiberal, partial, or 
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weak democracies.  The lack of focus on state-building on the part 
of “democracy aid practitioners” was an important reason for the 
failure of democratization in the 1990s:
… [D]emocracy aid practitioners did not give significant at-
tention to the challenge of a society trying to democratize 
while it is grappling with the reality of building a state from 
scratch or coping with an existent but largely nonfunctional 
state. (Carothers 2002 8-9)
The second Bush Administration’s focus on supporting Geor-
gia’s executive branch, which effectively translated into enhancing 
Saakashvili’s powers, harmed the realist—and perverted the lib-
eral—agenda.  Washington might have sought a genuine Georgian 
democracy, but its uncritical and unlimited support for Saakashvili 
has had adverse effects.  Worse yet, it has created a quasi-authori-
tarian regime.
In August 2008, Georgia engaged in a war with Russia over 
the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Through-
out the 1990s, South Ossetia and Abkhazia found themselves in a 
perpetual state of conflict with Georgia.  Though these conflicts re-
mained frozen during the early 2000s, they turned hot in the sum-
mer of 2008.  Russia, defending the autonomy of regions that had 
been attacked by Saakashvili’s forces, decisively defeated Georgia. 
The war with Russia harmed Georgia’s territorial integrity, econ-
omy, and international reputation.  Now, the prospects of reinte-
gration are even more unlikely and the government of Saakashvili 
faces stiff political opposition.  The potential of Georgia to serve as 
a strategic partner against Russia has been weakened.
Herein lies the paradox of U.S. government assistance to 
Georgia: Washington’s help was intended to strengthen democ-
racy in Georgia while enhancing the country’s national security.  In 
reality, U.S. assistance has weakened the democratization process, 
creating a dangerous situation whereby Saakashvili can unilaterally 
engage in a war with an adversary as powerful as Russia. 
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inDePenDent meDia anD the Civil soCiety seCtor 
In the years before the Rose Revolution, the U.S. government 
supported free media in Georgia through the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and various State De-
partment programs.  Foreign media assistance can have ambiguous 
effects on democratization, but there is evidence that U.S. media 
support in Georgia actually strengthened independent media orga-
nizations and improved professional journalism (Carothers 1999; 
“U.S. Government Assistance”).  U.S. support of television channel 
Rustavi 2, for instance, allowed the channel to become an impor-
tant platform for the opposition during the Rose Revolution.
In the annual report to Congress in 2000, the U.S. govern-
ment noted its support of 31 commercial and 19 regional televi-
sion stations, as well as exchange and training programs for Geor-
gian journalists at media outlets such as The Washington Post (“U.
S. Government Assessment” 45). In 2001, the U.S. supported the 
training of more than 400 print journalists through the Interna-
tional Center for Journalists (ICFJ), and assisted 31 television sta-
tions and more than ten independent radio stations (“U.S. Govern-
ment Assistance” 54-55). 
When Saakashvili was elected, the focus of U.S. assistance 
changed drastically.  USAID and the Department of State dramat-
ically reduced funding for independent media programs.2   USAID 
assisted no “media civil society organizations” in 2006—and just 
five in 2007. Moreover, in November 2007, USAID announced 
plans to assist another five organizations in 2008 (“USAID Perfor-
mance Report”). These numbers were released by the U.S. Embassy 
in Tbilisi just days after the Saakashvili regime brutally suppressed 
demonstrators in Tbilisi and raided Imedi TV and Kavkasia, the 
only independent television stations left in Georgia at the time.3 
2 The U.S. government continued to support the provision of internet access, but the 
internet plays a marginal role in Georgia’s political landscape. 
3 In September 2007, the arrest of Irakli Okruashvili, an opposition politician, led to a 
series of demonstrations reaching a climax in November, when 50,000-75,000 people 
demonstrated for new elections. In response, the Georgian government dispersed the 
rallies with violence and declared a “state of emergency.” Independent television stations 
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In its 2008 Nations in Transit report, Freedom House supported 
its decision to downgrade its rating of independent media freedom 
in Georgia:
[…] Georgian media demonstrate weak editorial indepen-
dence and low professional standards and are often used to 
promote the political interests of their owners. […] Tem-
porary suspension of Imedi, the major opposition-oriented 
TV and radio, questioned the government’s commitment to 
media freedom and exposed the fragility of media pluralism. 
(233-234)
Despite the “fragility of media” in Georgia, Washington has not 
begun any initiative to support independent media outlets.  In 
USAID’s 2007 annual report, published after the November dem-
onstrations, the U.S. government justified its position:  
Given the need to address the critical upcoming election needs 
[as a result of the events of November, Saakashvili agreed to 
early presidential elections], funds were not budgeted for a 
new start in media. Therefore the media sector assessment 
was postponed. (19)
The U.S. government’s assessment appears to be somewhat cynical. 
Georgian society, after all, can benefit from the presence of indepen-
dent and professional media before elections, and “relatively small 
amounts of money can make a fundamental difference to newspa-
pers or radio stations under siege” (Carothers 239).  Nevertheless, 
the U.S. government remained firm in its redirection of assistance 
from the media sector to the Georgian executive branch.4  
The once thriving civil society sector has also been weakened 
were raided, their equipment smashed while staff was intimidated at gunpoint. Another 
important television station, Rustavi Two, has become notably less critical of the 
government since 2006.
4 In the presidential elections of January 2008, opposition candidates received about 25% 
of the vote, despite highly restricted media access. Moreover, the ruling party by outspent 
the opposition candidates by a factor of 30 (Lanskoy and Areshidze 164).
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by the shift in U.S. aid.  Civic organizations in Georgia—which 
were instrumental to the success of the Rose Revolution—have 
been in decline. According to a 2007 Freedom House Report:
Many civil society leaders joined President Saakashvili in 
government and the organizations they left were unable to 
rebuild as the U.S. government redirected its democracy as-
sistance funding away from supporting civil society to helping 
the Georgian government implement its reform plans. (“Aid 
to Georgia”) 
Ironically, the author of Freedom House’s Nations in Transit, 
Ghia Nodia, joined the Georgian government in early 2008, a few 
months after the publication of the above letter.  In The Political 
Landscape of Georgia, published in 2006, Nodia reaches a similar 
conclusion about the civil sector in Georgia: “Civil society institu-
tions experienced a relatively high level of development before the 
Rose Revolution […].  However, once Georgia got a popular and 
active government, civil society started to look less robust than it 
did before” (30). 
Like Nodia, many have left the civil society sector and joined 
the ranks of Saakashvili’s regime. David Darchiashvili, former ex-
ecutive director of the Open Society Institute, is now chairing a 
parliamentary committee for the Saakashvili government.  It is a 
well-known tactic of authoritarian regimes to mute critical voices 
by incorporating them into their power structures (Tilly 170). The 
United States has been aware of the decline of the civil society sec-
tor, yet it has continued to redirect assistance to state-building ef-
forts.  The United States’ overall assistance to Georgia has been 
fairly constant since 2003,5 but sector assistance has changed sig-
nificantly. 
5 In 2005, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a $295.3 million compact 
with Georgia. MCC cooperation is dependent among other factors on a country’s 
democratization progress.
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Figure1: Three of the largest sectors of U.S. government assistance to Georgia from 2001 
until 2006.  The sector “Security & Law Enforcement” has been growing while other sec-
tors remained fairly constant.  [Values are not adjusted for inflation.  Assistance through 
the Millennium Challenge Account is not included. Source: U.S. Department of State.]
Of all the sectors of U.S. assistance to Georgia, “Security & 
Law Enforcement” has increased the most.  In 2006, this sector 
consisted of about $12 million in “Foreign Military Financing,” $8 
million in “Export Control & Related Border Security Assistance,” 
and $7 million in “Law Enforcement Assistance.”  Assistance for 
“Democratic Reform,” which includes support for independent 
media and the civil society sector, has remained fairly constant.  Yet 
even while assistance for democratization has remained steady at 
approximately $18 million per year, the composition of the “Dem-
ocratic Reform” sector has changed greatly.  After 2003, the U.S. 
government focused efforts on strengthening the executive branch. 
In a FY 2003 report, Washington summarized its assistance strat-
egy for Georgia: 
The USG [U.S. government] has offered its help to Georgia’s 
new leadership in advancing their declared agenda, which 
includes far-reaching political and economic reform and an 
aggressive anti-corruption campaign. (“U.S. Government As-
sistance”)
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Since 2003, Georgia’s economy has been growing at a rapid 
pace culminating in more than twelve percent growth in GDP in 
2007 and a sharp increase in foreign direct investment. Interna-
tional resonance has been very positive.  In 2008, the Wall Street 
Journal and the Heritage Foundation ranked Georgia 32nd, up 
from 68th, on its index of economic freedom (“Index of Economic 
Freedom”). The World Bank ranked Georgia 15th in its annual re-
port on Doing Business in 2008.
There is a commonly held assumption that economic growth 
is more likely to take place under authoritarian regimes and that, 
once prosperous, countries will democratize. Przeworski, Alvarez, 
Cheibub, and Limongi showed that authoritarian regimes, no mat-
ter how economically stable, offer no advantage in “attaining the 
dual goal of development and democracy" (Przeworski et al. 2). 
Nevertheless, the success of Georgia’s economic growth has made 
it relatively easy for the U.S. government to justify its support for 
the executive branch while overlooking democratic shortcomings. 
Even after the development of quasi-authoritarian rule, Washing-
ton has continued to support the Georgian government.
aDverse effeCts of u.s. assistanCe
Saakashvili has consolidated his power by amending the 
Georgian constitution, which is now markedly less liberal than it 
was prior to 2003.  Shortly after the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili 
extended the powers of the president and contracted those of other 
institutions, most notably the parliament.  The president now ap-
points the prime minister, cabinet members, and even officials such 
as university provosts.  In addition, the president can dissolve par-
liament if it rejects the president’s choice of prime minister or the 
president’s proposed budget.  As a result, parliament has lost one of 
its primary functions: control over the state budget, which is now 
entirely at the discretion of the president.  “Parliament has largely 
become an implementer of executive initiatives” and has been called 
the “government’s notary” (Lanskoy and Areshidze 160; Papava 2). 
In 2007, Saakashvili pressed the parliament to extend “the term of 
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the standing Parliament from April to October–December 2008, 
anticipating security challenges that might stem from coinciding 
elections in Russia and Georgia in April 2008” (Nodia 236).
According to Lincoln Mitchell, “Saakashvili enjoys more for-
mal power than Shevardnadze ever did”(672). In an attempt to con-
solidate power, Saakashvili reinvigorated Georgian nationalism and 
vowed to reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia long before the 
war in August 2008.  “Indeed, it is Saakashvili’s populist and patri-
otic drumbeating that makes his preference for illiberal democracy 
so worrisome” (Kupchan 11).  Saakashvili is ruling Georgia with a 
circle of close advisors who are rarely willing to consider dissenting 
opinions; as a result, the lines between the ruling United National 
Movement (UNM) party and the government have become blurry. 
Saakashvili’s largely uncontested power and the lack of opposition 
forces undoubtedly contributed to a situation whereby he was able 
to unilaterally declare war on Russia in August 2008.
David Usupashvili, chairman of the opposition Republican 
Party, charges the United States with contributing to the high 
concentration of power around Saakashvili: “The political elites 
[in Georgia] are supported by Washington, and this helps to keep 
them in power and arrests democratization” (Kupchan 12). Despite 
Saakashvili’s nationalist rhetoric, orders to crack down on peace-
ful demonstrators in Tbilisi, the closing of independent television 
stations, and other blatant signs of anti-democratic governance, 
Washington continued to fund and support his regime.
The effects of U.S. assistance to Georgia are two-dimen-
sional.  First, U.S. support for the Saakashvili regime slowed down 
democratization in Georgia.  Some scholars argue that post-Soviet 
states, with the exception of the Baltic countries, have not made any 
significant progress toward democratization.  Carothers and Larry 
Diamond consider most post-Soviet states static “hybrid regimes,” 
with a mix of limited democratic elements—such as managed elec-
tions—in otherwise predominantly authoritarian systems (Caroth-
ers 2002; Diamond).  Henry Hale argues that political changes in 
most post-Soviet states are cyclical rather than transformational. 
On Hale’s view, the Rose Revolution would be considered part 
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of a cyclical oscillation, with different elite factions competing for 
power. 
In the case of Russia, Hale’s analysis appears to be very con-
vincing.  However, Georgia exhibits some important structural 
differences that may render Hale’s theory inapplicable.  First, 
Georgian elites are less rich and influential compared with their 
Russian, Ukrainian, and even Central Asian counterparts.  As a 
country with no significant resource reserves, Georgia had little 
wealth to distribute to patronage networks after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  Second, a strong correlation between democratiza-
tion and prospective European Union (EU) membership has been 
demonstrated, and the effects of prospective EU membership on 
democracy in Georgia are substantial: “For the Georgian case, de-
mocracy is analogous with becoming part of Europe [and NATO], 
because we look at EU [and NATO] not only as economic or mili-
tary organizations but as clubs of democratic countries” (Rondeli). 
Additionally, unlike Russia and the Central Asian states, Georgia 
participates in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which 
provides further incentive to democratize.  This essay follows Mi-
chael McFaul’s rather optimistic analysis of democracy in some 
post-Soviet states, such as Georgia, and considers the Rose Revo-
lution a breakthrough on the path toward democracy. According to 
this theory, Saakashvili’s presidency has slowed, but not reversed 
Georgian democratization.
The second effect of U.S. assistance in Georgia was the cre-
ation of a false sense of security in Tbilisi.  Without significant po-
litical opposition, Saakashvili increasingly oriented his country to-
ward the West, making EU and NATO membership a top priority. 
Strong U.S. support for NATO membership encouraged Tbilisi 
to continue its rigorously pro-Western direction and allowed Saa-
kashvili to strike an increasingly hostile foreign policy agenda with 
Moscow that was not mitigated by political opposition, indepen-
dent media, or NGOs in Georgia.  The most lucid example of this 
false sense of security is perhaps best found in Washington’s sup-
port for Georgian NATO membership.  In an article for the Fi-
nancial Times, Francis Fukuyama summarizes the consequences of 
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U.S. support in the following way: 
The Bush Administration was not and could not have been 
serious about NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine 
to the extent that it meant providing not just arms and advis-
ers, but real security guarantees of [American] forces.  To the 
extent that that was so, leading the Georgians on to believe 
that we would get them into the club soon was a big mistake. 
(11)
Strong U.S. support for the Saakashvili’s regime posed sig-
nificant obstacles for political opposition and encouraged him to 
overestimate the strength of Georgia’s position vis-à-vis Russia. 
Both factors significantly contributed to Saakashvili’s decision to 
engage in a war with Russia. 
Despite the outcome, there is no evidence that Washington 
was seeking a war between Russia and Georgia.  On the contrary, 
numerous U.S. government statements indicate the opposite.  Just 
a few weeks before the outbreak of the war on August 7, Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice said in a press conference with Saakash-
vili: 
It is extremely important that the conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia be resolved on the basics—basis of principles 
that respect that territorial integrity, that respect the need for 
them to be resolved peacefully.  We have noted concerns that 
violence should be—should not be carried out by any party. 
(qtd. in “Remarks with Georgian President”) 
During a private dinner with Saakashvili, Rice was even more 
explicit in her demands. According to a senior administration of-
ficial, “she told him [Saakashvili], in no uncertain terms, that he 
had to put a non-use of force pledge on the table” (qtd. in Coo-
per and Shanker A10). Despite Rice’s demands, Georgia went 
ahead with plans to recapture South Ossetia in a Blitzkrieg-like 
operation, thus risking open conflict with Russia, which had previ-
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ously pledged to defend the territorial integrity of the break-away 
regions.  Confirming Washington’s worst fears, Russia’s military 
crushed Georgia’s army and caused significant economic damage 
while harming Georgia’s state integrity. 
Since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Saakashvili extended his 
power base at the expense of democracy in Georgia.  During his 
term, the Georgian constitution has become significantly less lib-
eral, and the Georgian parliament has lost several important func-
tions.  He has drastically increased military spending and let rela-
tions with Moscow sharply deteriorate.  Despite some early signs 
of Saakashvili’s “problematic ruling,” Washington has continued to 
support the executive branch of the Georgian system and neglected 
independent media and civil society sectors.
ConClusion
Referring to the political and economic reform process in 
Georgia, Alexander Rondeli, director of one of the few remaining 
Georgian NGOs, described Saakashvili’s regime as “social surgery 
without anesthesia” (qtd. in Schellinger).  Before the recent war 
with Russia, there was a prevalent idea within the Georgian gov-
ernment that the Georgian people had to swallow some “sour pills” 
to overcome domestic and international challenges.  For Saakash-
vili, democratic consolidation is clearly no longer a top priority.  In 
his view, Georgia must first overcome security and economic chal-
lenges before making the “leap to democracy”.  The problems asso-
ciated with this theory are grave.  It presumes that democratization 
can be “put on hold” and then “resumed” at the whim of governing 
elites.
For the Bush administration, Georgia has lost its place as 
the “beacon of democracy.” It has turned into the latest disaster of 
the administration’s democracy-promotion agenda.  Washington’s 
strong support for the executive branch of the Georgian govern-
ment perverted the “liberal agenda” of promoting democracy and 
security in Georgia.  U.S. assistance strengthened the Saakashvili 
regime at the expense of independent media and the civil society 
83Journal of Politics & Society
sector.  Even Washington’s realist interests have been severely dam-
aged as a result of unbalanced U.S. democracy promotion.  After 
the war with Russia, Georgia’s national security was threatened, 
its territorial integrity severely harmed, and its economy shaken. 
Today, Georgia is less valuable to the United States as a regional 
partner, and Saakashvili’s government faces serious challenges from 
opposition leaders.  The White House’s seemingly unshakable trust 
in Saakashvili’s democratization plans—a trust that was perhaps 
based on Georgia’s economic success—secured U.S. government 
assistance for Saakashvili’s government.  The case of Georgia has 
shown that linking democracy promotion to a single political lead-
er while neglecting critical elements of democratic consolidation is 
not an effective strategy.  In a sense, U.S. government assistance has 
contributed to the rise of authoritarian elements—and an illiberal 
constitution—in Georgia. 
Democracy in Georgia is not the only thing at stake; what 
is more important, perhaps, is the legitimacy of U.S. democracy-
promotion efforts as a whole.  The United States should promote 
broad democratization rather than hyper-powerful executive re-
gimes.  Otherwise, as Mitchell points out, “state-corporatist” mod-
els—such as China and Russia—may become an attractive alterna-
tive for hybrid regimes around the world (Mitchell 74). 
The case of Georgia has important policy implications for 
U.S. democracy promotion.  If some cases of the 1990s taught the 
U.S. that democracy promotion does not automatically reinforce 
state-building, the case of Georgia demonstrates how a strong em-
phasis on state-building can lead to the emergence of authoritarian 
elements and harm the broader agenda of democracy promotion. 
There is hope that democracy in Georgia could benefit from 
more “de-personalized” relations between Washington and Tbilisi 
under the Presidency of Barack Obama.  The new U.S. govern-
ment should now consider shifting to a strategic balance between 
the promotion of state-building and support for civil society.  This 
should include funding for independent media and civic organiza-
tions, as well as support for political parties in Georgia. 
The rewards for Washington could be mixed. Georgia might 
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become less hostile toward Russia and perhaps more cautious on 
issues related to energy and the war in Iraq.  Most likely, however, it 
would remain a reliable partner of the United States.  On the other 
hand, if true democratization is resumed, Georgia could become a 
“true” outpost at the frontier of freedom and serve as an example of 
successful U.S. democracy promotion strategy. 
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